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We analyse two potential effects arising from regional (and with EU) integration—increased 
quality of institutions (including the quality of financial institutions) and, economic policies and 
reduced multilateral exchange rate volatility—in a conditional convergence growth framework 
for MENA countries. To this purpose we outline an ad hoc methodology which implements the 
traditional bilateral exchange rate measures to test effects of multilateral exchange rate volatility 
on growth of per capita GDP. Our estimates show that both factors (quality of institutions and 
reduction of multilateral volatility) significantly and positively affect growth and conditional 
convergence. We observe that MENA countries are not far from EU and OECD countries in 
terms of exchange rate volatility, but much below in terms of institutional quality. We finally 
simulate the potential effects of an improvement in institutional quality in MENA countries on 
their process of growth and conditional convergence. We conclude arguing that regional 
integration may be highly beneficial for such countries, mainly because of its effects on 
institutional quality. 
Keywords: institutions, exchange rate, economic policy 
JEL classification: F31, F36  
 
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and 
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute 
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes 
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the 
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally 
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the 
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff 
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of 
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world. 
www.wider.unu.edu publications@wider.unu.edu 
 
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Camera-ready typescript prepared by T:mi LHR Editorial and Secretarial Assistance 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply 
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of 
any of the views expressed. 
Acronyms 
AFA  advantage of flexibility argument 
CVA  the cost of volatility argument 
EU European  Union 
GDP  gross domestic product 
MENA  Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Somalia, 
Syria Tunisia, and Turkey 
MU monetary  union 
OCAs  optimal currency areas 
QIRMPs  quality of institutional rules and macroeconomic policies 
REERs  real effective exchange rates 
TPR  trade portfolio risk 
 




Two of the main (anticipated and concurring) effects expected from regional integration 
among virtuous countries (or around a core of economically more advanced countries) 
are reduced exchange rate volatility, and higher and less heterogeneous quality of 
institutional rules and macroeconomic policies. In this paper we aim to evaluate the 
impact of past and future potential achievement in terms of regional integration of 
MENA countries among themselves and with the EU on these two expected effects and 
on levels and growth of real per capita GDP. We measure the magnitude of these two 
effects by looking at real effective exchange rates (REERs) and at different indicators of 
quality of institutional rules (including the quality of financial institutions) and 
macroeconomic policies (QIRMPs), without neglecting the potential costs generated   
by the reduction of exchange rate flexibility implied by exchange rate agreements 
within the process of regional integration. To do so we overcome the traditional limits 
of bilateral exchange rate measures and we build a measure of real effective exchange 
rate volatility which we call trade portfolio risk (also TPR). We define the trade 
portfolio risk as the risk of a portfolio whose assets are country’s exchange rates with 
the main trading partners weighted by bilateral country trade shares. We then measure 
the effects of ‘trade portfolio risk’ and institutional quality for MENA countries on 
levels and rates of growth of real per capita GDP in order to evaluate the effects of past 
and future perspective benefits of an increased economic integration within the region 
and with the EU. 
The paper is divided into seven sections (including this introduction and the 
conclusions). In the second section we briefly illustrate the two alternative arguments on 
the effects of exchange rate policies on economic growth focusing on the costs of 
volatility and the advantage of flexibility arguments. In the third section we illustrate 
theoretical and empirical findings on the effects of exchange rate volatility and 
institutional quality on growth. In the fourth section we propose our new trade portfolio 
volatility measure explaining how it may be particularly helpful in separating and 
testing simultaneously effects of costs of volatility and advantage of flexibility. In the 
fifth section we present descriptive findings showing how MENA countries seem quite 
in line with OECD and EU countries in terms of control of multilateral exchange rate 
volatility, while they definitely lag behind in terms of indicators of institutional quality. 
In the sixth section we present descriptive and econometric findings of our research, 
trying to evaluate the costs (and the perspective gains in case of acceleration of the 
process of regional integration) of the institutional gap of MENA countries in terms of 
growth and convergence. 
2  Cost of volatility and advantage of flexibility: theoretical rationales 
and empirical findings 
In the past, the evaluation of the effects of exchange rate regimes and volatility on 
growth has led to the development of two different arguments. 
The first can be defined as the cost of volatility argument (CVA). It establishes that 
exchange rate volatility may be harmful for growth and thus provides indirect support to 
the creation of monetary unions which eliminate part of this volatility (Buiter, Corsetti 
and Pesenti 1998). According to this perspective, the elimination of exchange rate  
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volatility among union members (Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti 1998; Devereux, Engel 
and Tille 1999) is generally considered a beneficial effect, given the perception that:  
unpredictable volatility can inflict damage … [and that] … although the 
associated costs have not been quantified rigorously, many economists 
believe that exchange rate uncertainty reduces international trade, 
discourages investment and compounds the problems people face in 
insuring their human capital in incomplete asset markets (Obstfeld and 
Rogoff 1995: 73-96). 
Along the same line, De Grauwe and Schnabl (2004) emphasize that while the Mundell 
(1961) theory of optimal currency areas (OCAs) (which they term as Mundell I, 
following a classification proposed by McKinnon 2004) suggests the well-known 
caveats to be considered before opting for entering a monetary union, MU (minimum 
level of trade integration, limited occurrence of asymmetric shocks, sufficient mobility 
of workers), Mundell (1973a, 1973b) (or Mundell II) provide very different 
prescriptions. When exchange rate movements are an independent source of volatility 
and are also driven by speculative dynamics,1 anticipated entry into MUs may help 
small open economies to avoid negative macroeconomic effects of exchange rate 
volatility. The empirical findings of De  Grauwe and Schnabl (2004) support this 
hypothesis finding a positive association between exchange rate stability and growth in 
Central and Eastern Europe in the last decade. 
The second view, which we will term the advantage of flexibility argument (AFA), 
finds that terms of trade shocks are amplified in countries with more rigid exchange rate 
regimes and that, after controlling for other factors, countries with flexible exchange 
rate regimes grow faster (Edwards and Levy-Yeyati 2003). This second approach traces 
back to Meade’s (1951) argument that in countries with fixed exchange rates and 
inflexible money wages, adjustment in the equilibrium real exchange rates arising from 
external shocks occur through domestic nominal prices and domestic wages. In such 
cases, shock absorption would be easier under flexible exchange rate regimes. The same 
author recognizes that flexible exchange rates may not be of help in case of inflexible 
real wages, due to some indexation mechanisms. The advantage of flexibility also seems 
to be supported by empirical evidence. Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2003) finds that 
terms of trade shocks are amplified in countries with more rigid exchange rate regimes 
and that, after controlling for other factors, countries with fixed exchange rate regimes 
grow faster. Their results are consistent with those of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2003a) also using de facto exchange rate classifications. The same finding disappears 
in empirical works in which de jure classifications are adopted (Ghosh et al. 1996).2 
                                                 
1  The third generation of currency crisis models is very akin to this way of thinking since it shows how 
crises need not be triggered by misalignment of fundamentals but may also be triggered by self-
fulfilling agents’ expectations (Obstfeld 1986 and 1994).  
2  These findings are consistent with the argument of Ghosh et al. (1996) that ‘the de facto behaviour of 
exchange rate may diverge from its de jure classification’. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) argue that this 
difference may explain why results on the effects of exchange rate regimes on growth are 
inconclusive. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999) find that 12 out of 35 countries identified as free 
float have, in fact, some form of exchange rate rigidity. The phenomenon is called by these authors 
‘fear of floating’.  
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Our methodological point is that these two apparently conflicting views of the literature 
(advantage of flexibility and cost of volatility) may be tested to be not mutually 
exclusive when exchange rate volatility is properly measured with a multilateral trade 
weighted exchange rate. The rationale is that, while it is almost impossible to observe 
that AFA and CVA hold together when volatility is measured with the bilateral 
volatility with the dollar (given the strong negative relationship between the latter and 
fixed exchange rate regimes, especially if pegged to the dollar itself), multilateral trade 
weighted exchange rate volatility is unrelated with exchange rate regimes and allows the 
two arguments to be measured separately (Bagella, Becchetti and Hasan 2004). 
3.  The literature on exchange rate volatility, institutional quality and growth 
3.1  Exchange rate volatility and growth:  
theoretical underpinnings and empirical measures 
The main effects of exchange rate volatility on growth are expected to occur via the 
investment channel. The impact of exchange rate volatility on investment is, in 
principle, ambiguous as it depends on assumptions on market competitiveness, 
symmetry/asymmetry of investment adjustment costs and entrepreneurial attitudes 
toward risk (Caballero and Corbo 1989; Baum, Caglayan and Barkoulas 2001; Froot 
and Klemperer 1989; Serven 2000).  
The effect is definitely positive under perfect competition, risk neutrality and symmetric 
costs of capital adjustment (Caballero and Corbo 1989), due to the well-known property 
of convexity of the profit function. This property implies that potential losses for 
insufficient investment in good states are higher than potential costs for excess capacity 
in bad states. Hence, firms will overinvest when the exchange rate volatility is higher. 
The positive relationship does not hold anymore when we remove the assumptions of 
risk neutrality and symmetric costs of capital adjustment. In doing so, we realize we are 
getting closer to the real world if we just consider that the existence of sunk costs 
implies per se that costs of downward adjustments are higher than those of upward 
adjustments. More specifically, it has been shown that irreversibility must be 
accompanied by imperfect competition and decreasing returns to scale to invert the sign 
(from positive to negative) of the relationship between uncertainty, investment and 
growth (Serven 2000). By introducing the reasonable assumption of risk aversion in this 
framework, the direction of the link between investment and volatility becomes 
definitely and unequivocally negative. 
On the empirical side, evidence on the exchange rate volatility/growth nexus is scant 
and controversial, also because of methodological problems arising in the definition of 
exchange rate volatility. Nonetheless, several empirical findings seem consistent with 
the above mentioned theoretical approach which considers the role of asymmetric sunk 
costs and finds a negative relationship among exchange rate volatility, investment and 
growth (Cottani, Cavallo and Khan 1990; Dollar 1992; Ghura and Grennes 1993; Darby 
et al. 1999).  
4 
3.2  Institutional quality and growth: 
theoretical underpinnings and empirical measures 
The huge amount of empirical literature on growth and conditional convergence is, in 
most cases, an empirical test of the Solow or Solow-augmented growth model in the 
version proposed by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). Their model has proven to be 
particularly successful, as the empirical specification to be tested can be easily 
accommodated to test hypotheses on the inclusion of additional factors affecting 
conditional convergence and different from human and physical capital investment. A 
survey summarizing results of this research field outlines something like 87 different 
factors potentially affecting conditional convergence (Durlauf and Quah 1998). Among 
them, quality of economic policies and of institutions plays a dominant role among 
them. Among those surveyed by Durlauf and Quah (1998) in their empirical studies, 
institutions (Rodrik 2000; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995) or, more specifically, financial 
institutions (Pagano 1993; King and Levine 1993) play a crucial role together with 
human capital (Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992). Other factors such as the government 
sector (Hall and Jones 1999), social and political stability (Alesina and Perotti 1994) 
and corruption (Mauro 1995) all appears as different facets of the quality of institutions 
and economic policies. 
In a direct evaluation of the relative significance of different factors which confirms our 
previous considerations, Sala-i-Martin (2002) finds that institutional quality is one of 
the most robust. The impact of institutions on growth with specific reference to 
transition countries is tested by De Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1996) and by Fischer, 
Sahay and Vegh (1996). 
With regard to the innumerable theoretical rationales provided to explain the role of 
institutional quality on growth, we briefly remember some of the most important and 
representative ones: Rodrik (1999, 2002) argue that market based economies, to be 
successful, crucially need good institutions and, more specifically, institutions to protect 
property rights, to fight corruption, to support macroeconomic stabilization and to 
promote social cohesion. Klein and Luu (2003) find that that technical efficiency is 
positively related to policies supporting laissez-faire and political structures that 
promote policy stability. Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) find that good institutions 
support the creation of the infrastructure needed to promote growth. 
4 Our  methodology 
The methodology for the construction of the multilateral exchange rate volatility is 
based on the idea that a country may be conceived as having a portfolio of assets 
represented by its relationships with trade partners. We measure potential benefits of 
economic integration by proposing a measure of exchange rate risk called trade 
portfolio risk (also TPR). We call trade portfolio risk the risk of a portfolio whose assets 
are a country’s exchange rates with its main trade partners weighted by bilateral country 
trade (export plus import) shares. 
  
5 
More formally, if the i-th country has trade relationships with j (j=1,..,N) partners, the 
variance of its portfolio σp,i
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Where σj
2 is the variance of the return of the j-th asset, i. e., the rate of return of the 
bilateral exchange rate with the j-th partner. xj is the share of trade to the j-th partner out 
of the i-th country total export, σhk is the covariance between bilateral exchange rate 
returns of the i-th country with partners h and k. Our measure of effective exchange 
rate variance is therefore a ‘portfolio variance’. It includes the volatility of each bilateral 
exchange rate and their covariances weighted for their relative trade shares. To analyse 
the behaviour of the export portfolio risk variable, we calculate moving windows of 
average two-year variances of mean monthly exchange rate returns weighted for the 
trade shares in our sample period. 
With respect to a simple bilateral exchange rate with a leading currency (i.e., the dollar), 
the TPR variable has three advantages. First, it includes neighbours’ (or trade partners’) 
externalities in the evaluation of the effects of exchange rate volatility on growth. This 
inclusion is fundamental because a country may have good governance and good 
macroeconomic policies (and may, therefore, be likely to have a low bilateral exchange 
rate volatility with a leading currency, say, the dollar) but may import instability via 
variability of governance and economic policies of its trade partners. Individual country 
stability is therefore insufficient if it is not framed into regional stability and this is why 
the export portfolio risk variable is more likely to measure the costs of missing regional 
integration.3 
A second important advantage of this measure is that favourable and unfavourable 
exchange rate movements with different trade partners may compensate each other, 
thereby dampening the negative effects of individual bilateral exchange rate volatility 
on growth (Qian and Varangis 1994). This effect is incorporated in our export portfolio 
risk measure which conveniently takes into account the potential impact of trade 
diversification on export risk. 
A third final advantage is that this measure is much less correlated with exchange rate 
regimes than bilateral exchange rate volatility with the dollar and therefore it gives the 
opportunity of jointly testing the advantage of flexibility and the cost of volatility 
arguments as explained above. When building the TPR index we consider that, as far as 
trade shares of a given trading partner get lower, their contribution to the TPR becomes 
negligible. For this reason, and in order to avoid including trade partners with very 
small shares in the analysis, we consider the following three constraints: (i) no more 
than seven partners; (ii) a cumulative trade share not higher than 60 per cent, and (iii) an 
                                                 
3  A typical example for illustrating this point is that the inspection of the volatility of the bilateral 
dollar-Argentinean peso exchange rate would suggest low nominal (and slightly higher real) export 
portfolio risk before the Argentinean crisis, while our measure of export portfolio risk would have 
been higher including the volatility generated by the devaluation of the currency of one of its main 
trade partners (such as Brazil).  
6 
individual partner share not smaller than 2 per cent. When one of these constraints is hit, 
we do not include additional trade partners in our TPR measure.4 
5  The specification of our conditional convergence growth model  
We test the effect of trade portfolio volatility and quality of institutions and economic 
policies in a standard specification of a Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) model 
augmented for the role of institutions and exchange rate volatility.  
It is trivial to see that, when we assume that part of the A-factor augmenting labour 
productivity is proxied by quality of institutions and multilateral exchange rate 
volatility, the model leads to the following specification in levels 
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are two specific components (quality of institutional rules and macroeconomic policies 
and real effective exchange rate volatility) of the country-specific factors augmenting 
the effects of labour input on levels and growth of real per capita GDP when we 
interpret AV(QI, REERV, ...) as AV=γ1AQIMP*γ2AREERV*γ3Ar where Ar captures all additional 
factors affecting the labour augmenting component. In this augmented MRW model, the 
possibility that all countries have the same steady state level of per capita income 
depends not only on the levelling of their rate of population growth and of their physical 
and human capital investment rates, but also on REER and quality of rules and 
macroeconomic policies. 
Our augmented version of the model will be estimated also in growth rates under the 
following specification:  
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The difference with respect to the traditional MRW approach is in the interpretation of 
the common intercept and in the fact that convergence may be prevented by differences 
in the quality of policies and institutions and by REER volatility. 
Variables for our empirical analysis are taken from various sources. The dependent 
variable Y/L is the real gross domestic product per working age person, L is the working 
                                                 
4  Sensitivity analysis on our cutoff criteria shows that small changes do not alter the substance of our 
results. Results are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request.  
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age population (population aged between 15-64). sk is gross domestic investment over 
GDP and is calculated using values taken from World Bank Development Indicators, sh 
is secondary school gross enrolment ratio. Indicators of institutional quality are taken 
from the economic freedom indicators of the Frazer Institute. 
To interpret our model, and especially findings from the growth estimate in (2), 
remember that while the MRW estimation framework was adopted by the authors 
originally to test the (human capital augmented) Solow exogenous growth model, 
Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) show that such estimation framework is consistent 
with any growth model that admits a balanced growth path and therefore is compatible 
also with suitable endogenous growth models. 
The exogenous/endogenous growth issue has special interest when we interpret the 
results of our growth equation, given that the interpretation under the two perspectives 
is quite different. 
The validity of the MRW framework in the augmented Solow model perspective 
implies that growth is determined by transitional dynamics, leading to the steady state 
equilibrium level of per capita GDP (the latter being affected by country fundamentals 
which include human capital investment). Growth from this perspective is uniquely 
determined by exogenous changes in the labour augmenting A-factor. 
The same empirical finding would imply, in the endogenous growth perspective, that 
human capital investment directly affects growth and not just equilibrium levels of per 
capita GDP. 
However, since we introduce REER volatility and quality of institutions and economic 
policies as determinants of the A-factor,  the traditional distinction between 
exogenous/endogenous growth models in terms of the role of economic policy as a 
growth stimulus fades away.  
By arguing that REER volatility and quality of institutions and economic policies proxy 
important components of the A-factor which augments labour productivity and is 
uniquely responsible of further growth from the equilibrium point, we implicitly 
introduce the importance of institutions and policies also in the exogenous growth 
framework. 
6 Empirical  findings 
6.1 Descriptive  evidence  on  exchange rate volatility 
The first descriptive evidence on the dynamics of trade portfolio volatility in different 
macroareas is provided in Table 1. We can see here that MENA countries are quite an 
exception, since they exhibit an average TPR much lower than that of other developing 
countries and are in line with that of OECD or EU countries at the end of the sample 
period. In addition, MENA countries seem to have successfully reduced their trade 
weighted exchange rate volatility from the very high levels of 1990, but also of 1994 
when their TPR was about 40 times higher.  
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In the same direction Figure 1 shows that historical shocks on trade portfolio volatility 
for MENA countries have been much milder than those affecting HIPCs (heavily 
indebted poor countries) or Latin American countries. An important distinction needs to 
be made between Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean MENA countries, since we 
expect that the low TPR of the former has been helped by the process of integration 
with the EU. This impression is confirmed when we observe trade share dynamics. 
Mediterranean MENA countries have maintained around 50 per cent their trade share 
with EU countries throughout all the sample period and have a lower and slightly 
declining trade shares with the US (above 40 per cent). Trade shares versus EU and US 
are much smaller for non-Mediterranean MENA countries (around 10 per cent) 
(Figure 2). 
6.2  Descriptive evidence on quality of institutions and macroeconomic policies 
If MENA countries have a TPR almost in line with that of most developed countries, the 
gap is much more pronounced when considering another important factor of conditional 
convergence represented by the quality of institutions and macroeconomic policies.  
We are well aware of the problems arising when building composite indicators such as 
those generally used in comparing institutions at international level. For this reason, as 
indicator on the quality of institutions and economic policies we employ a benchmark 
commonly used in the literature and represented by individual and aggregate 
components of the index published in the Economic Freedom of the World: 2000 
Annual Report issued by the Frazer Institute.5 The index is a weighted average of the 
different composed indicators designed to identify the quality of institutional 
arrangements and policies in major areas (see Appendix 1 for details).  
We focus on three measures:  
i)  regulation of money credit and business 
ii)  legal structure and property rights; and 
iii)  a composite index which includes indicators (i) and (ii) plus the access to 
sound money and freedom to exchange with foreigners indicators. 
We compare the dynamics of the indicator for MENA countries vis-a-vis the Eurozone, 
OECD non-EU, the transition countries that entered the EU in 2004 and transition-non 
candidates (Figures 3a-3c). All of the three pictures show similar patterns. Eurozone and 
OECD non EU countries have the highest scores. The transition countries that entered 
the EU start from low values but are rapidly converging to those of the first two groups. 
MENA countries, together with transition non-candidates, share the lowest scores. In 
the next section we try to evaluate the costs in terms of reduced growth of the lower 
quality of institutions and economic policies. 
                                                 
5  In a recent survey paper on these indicators, Whilborg (2004) demonstrates the strong correlation 
between the Frazer Institute indicators on the quality of institutions, institution investor country credit 
rating and transparency international’s corruption perception index.  
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6.3 Econometric  evidence 
We perform our estimates on World Bank data on a dataset recording values for 120 
countries for a sample period ranging from 1980 to 2000. Table 1 clearly shows that the 
trade portfolio risk variable in different macroareas is highly variable across time. In a 
cross-sectional estimate the effect of such variability on growth is not accounted for. We 
therefore believe that a panel estimate may better enhance the impact of the TPR 
variable in the estimates. Data are grouped into five 5-year spells in order to provide 
acceptable timelags to test conditional convergence effects in growth estimates. 
We perform growth fixed effect panel estimates using the basic Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil (1992) approach in which the two main factors of growth are physical and human 
capital.6 
In the choice of these two crucial inputs, we fully take into account the debate of the 
recent literature. Our basic specification framework considers WB investment to GDP 
ratio and secondary school enrolment rates. In a further step, sensitivity analysis on the 
effects of TPR on growth is run by taking into account the refinements recently 
proposed in the literature and replacing (i) enrolment ratios with average schooling 
years corrected for quality and (ii) World Bank with Heston and Summers (1996) 
investment to GDP ratios, given that in the latter measures, changes in physical capital 
stock are corrected for quality according to the results of cross-country surveys on 
comparability of physical capital.7 
Results from different specifications of growth estimates under these two general 
frameworks for estimating human and physical capital are presented in Table 2.8 
Results of the baseline MRW specification show that conditional convergence is 
supported, even though human capital is not significant (Table 2: column 1). Note that 
this is also the problem of the seminal paper in this field (Islam 1995). We overcome the 
problem by augmenting the baseline specification with our TPR variable (Table 2: 
column 2). The introduction of the TPR variable is negative and significantly supports 
the cost of volatility argument.  
With reasonable arguments De Grauwe and Schnabl (2004) considers that the cost of 
volatility must be higher for open economies, and especially for small open economies. 
For this reason we conventionally create a small open economy dummy for countries 
with less than ten million inhabitants and a ratio of import plus exports over GDP higher 
than 50 per cent. Therefore, we test whether the relationship between TPR and growth is 
                                                 
6  To estimate our model we set the abnormal EPR levels of the two hyperinflationary countries (Bolivia 
and Nicaragua) at the 95th percentile value of the EPR variable. 
7  Even though adopted in most empirical growth papers, the choice of gross enrolment ratios as proxies 
of human capital investment has been criticized since current enrollment ratios represent the 
investment of future and not current workers (Wossmann 2003). The solution considered optimal by 
the empirical literature is to use average schooling calculated by Barro and Lee (2000) corrected for 
the quality of teaching, of the educational infrastructure, or of the curriculum. The adjustment is 
obtained by using Hanushek and Kimko’s (2000) educational quality index, conveniently normalized 
by Wossmann (2003) for each country relative to the measure for the United States. 
8  For each specification we also performed the correspondent level estimates obtaining results 
consistent with MRW predictions. Since the focus of the paper is on growth we omit presentation of 
level results.   
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significantly different for this specific group of countries. Our results are extremely 
strong and find that the highly significant effect of the TPR growth relationship for 
small open economies is the main part of the overall effect (Table 2: column 3).9 
In the next three specifications (Table 2: columns 4, 5 and 6) we want to evaluate the 
impact of institutional variables on the baseline MRW specification (column 1). We try 
three alternative specifications respectively considering: 
i)  regulation of money credit and business, 
ii)  legal structure and property rights, and 
iii)  the composite index which includes indicators (i) and (ii) plus the access to 
sound money and freedom to exchange with foreigners indicators (for details 
on the characteristics of this variable, see Appendix 1). 
The introduction of these regressors is strongly significant and the magnitude of the 
coefficients is not negligible. Consequently, the overall significance of the estimate is 
much higher than in the MRW baseline model. Since all variables are in logs, we may 
evaluate coefficient magnitudes in terms of elasticity (under the restrictive assumption 
of linearity of underlying variable effects). The highest impact is that of the credit, 
labour and business indicator (0.32 or 32 per cent elasticity of GDP growth to changes 
in the institutional variable), followed by the composite indicator (0.24) and by the legal 
and property right indicator (0.06). Even though these quantitative considerations need 
to be taken with extreme care, we may more broadly agree on the existence a strong and 
significant impact of the quality of institutions on GDP growth. A collateral effect of the 
introduction of these variables is the disappearance of the impact of human capital 
(exactly as in the baseline MRW model). This finding is likely to be explained by the 
strong relationship between the returns of human capital and institutional framework 
which create high collinearity between the two variables. 
In the following three specifications, we want to evaluate what happens with the joint 
inclusion of the exchange rate and institutional quality variables, including also the 
extra effect of TPR on small open economies, successfully tested in column 3. Results 
presented in columns 4, 5΄ and 6΄ illustrate the joint significance of the institutional 
quality and of the TPR variable, when interacted with the small open economy dummy. 
Coefficient magnitudes of the institutional quality variables do not vary substantially 
from previous specifications. We therefore conclude that institutional quality and 
reduction of exchange rate volatility are two crucial variables in conditional 
convergence, the latter especially for small open economies such as almost all MENA 
countries.  
An inspection of the economic significance of the impact of trade portfolio risk on 
growth reveals that our estimates imply an elasticity between 0.005 and 0.01 of the level 
of per capita GDP with respect to the TPR variable. Consequently, a 100 per cent 
increase in TPR corresponds on average to a 0.8 per cent lower level of per capita GDP 
growth in a five-year period. The compared magnitude of exchange rate flexibility 
seems much larger at first glance since its elasticity is around 0.03. Consider though that 
                                                 
9   This result is robust to the introduction of variables measuring the bilateral exchange rate with the 
dollar, lagged changes in terms of trade and the dummy for flexible exchange rate regimes. Evidence 
on this point is omitted for reasons of space and available from the authors upon request.  
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our descriptive evidence clearly shows that dramatic changes of TPR are not uncommon 
(Table 1). For instance, the TPR of transition candidates is six times smaller in 2000 
with respect to 1998, the TPR of Eurozone countries three times smaller in 2000 with 
respect to 1995 and ten times with respect to 1992. Given the magnitude of these TPR 
changes, their impact on growth is not at all negligible. 
A potential limit of our results depends on the ex post nature of our TPR variable while 
the theory predicts a relationship between ex ante expected exchange rate volatility and 
growth. A possible solution to this problem is the definition of a proxy of ex ante TPR, 
based on the strong relationship between TPR and quality of institutions and 
macroeconomic policies often advocated in the literature (see the Van Foreest and de 
Vries (2002) argument in section 2) and documented in descriptive findings of our 
paper. We therefore argue that institutional quality and/or quality of monetary policy 
indexes may be reasonable proxies of ex ante expected TPR. To maintain our 
multilateral framework, we build an E  [TPR] variable which is a trade-weighted 
difference in the quality of monetary policy with the main trading partners or, 
alternatively, trade weighted difference in the quality of institutions and of nominal 
interest rates. Results presented in Table 2 (column 7) show that the negative volatility-
growth nexus is still there when trade portfolio volatility is instrumented by the above 
mentioned variables. This last finding solves some potential endogeneity issues which 
may arise from the use of the TPR variable, but does not allow us to disentangle the 
effect of the two variables as we did in previous estimates. 
In the specification we introduce also a dummy for flexible exchange rates which is 
positive and significant. This confirms our hypothesis on the coexistence of cost of 
volatility and advantage of flexibility effects, and also the possibility of testing them 
together with our TPR measure.10 An additional robustness analysis is performed by 
checking whether the significance and magnitude of the effect of quality of institutions 
on the dependent variable persist when we replace our proxies of physical and human 
capital investment with variables recently suggested by the literature (see footnote 7). 
Table 3 summarizes the findings from this exercise showing how our main result is 
robust to these changes. 
By taking as reference coefficient magnitudes of institutional quality variables, we may 
make a simple quantitative exercise and check what would have been the predicted rate 
of growth in the last five years for MENA countries, had their level of institutional 
quality been that of the Eurozone countries or the transition countries that entered the 
EU in 2004. This simulation may help us to get an idea of the perspective gains for 
MENA countries from the improved institutional quality required by an advance in the 
process integration with Eurozone countries.  
Results of this exercise (Table 4) show that MENA countries in the last four years 
would have gained an additional cumulative 7.2 per cent growth with the overall index 
of economic freedom of the OECD non-EU countries, 5.4 per cent with those of the 
Eurozone countries and 1.5 per cent with those of the transition countries that accessed 
the EU in the 2004. With the index of quality in credit, labour and business, the extra 
growth would have been up to 13.2 per cent (same quality of OECD non Eurozone 
                                                 
10 The dummy is significant also when introduced in specifications of columns 2, 3, 4΄, 5΄ and 6΄. 
Results are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request.  
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countries), 8.4 per cent (same quality of Eurozone countries) and 6.2 per cent (same 
quality of transition countries which accessed the EU in the 2004). 
We are obviously well aware of the limits of these quantitative exercises. Even though 
the exact amount of the effect is no more than a qualified guess, we are much more 
confident of the existence and of the robustness of a positive and significant impact of 
quality of institutions on growth. 
7  Conclusions and policy implications for MENA countries 
There is a growing consensus on the substantial impact that processes of regional 
integration may have on the peaceful coexistence of different populations and countries. 
More needs to be said about the links of regional integration with economic 
development. Two important directions to follow in this respect are the analysis of the 
impact on economic growth of improvement in institutional quality and reduction of 
multilateral exchange rate volatility, since both of the two factors may be clearly related 
with regional integration processes. 
In this paper, we outline and estimate a simple conditional convergence model 
augmented for these two factors. Model estimates show that the positive impact of both 
of these is quite robust, even though the multilateral exchange rate volatility argument 
seems to hold particularly for small open economies. Important policy implications stem 
directly from this analysis if we just consider the composition of the institutional quality 
indicators. Our findings suggest that economic growth can definitely be enhanced by: 
—  The  quality of the legal system (judiciary independent and not subject to 
interference by the government or parties in disputes; impartial court with a 
trusted legal framework for private businesses to challenge the legality of 
government actions or regulation; protection of intellectual property; overall 
integrity of the legal system); 
—  Adequate monetary policies that promote price stability through the 
independence of central banks with anti-inflationary targets and by proper 
regulation in credit (competitive banking system, high percentage of credit 
extended to private sector); 
—  Labour (no inflationary system of collective bargaining and unemployment 
benefit systems which preserve incentive to work), and  
—  Business (limits in price control, reduction of bureaucratic delays in starting 
and managing a business, limits of trade and exchange rate controls). 
The implications of these results for MENA countries are quite relevant. In our findings 
we observe that while they seem quite in line with EU countries in terms of control of 
multilateral exchange rate volatility, they lag behind when we consider indicators of 
institutional quality. In a final tentative simulation we show that MENA countries’ 
conditional convergence is expected to be much faster, should they be able to catch up 
institutional quality levels of Euro-zone countries or even the level of the transition 
countries recently admitted in the EU. In many cases, institutional conflicts of interest 
and domestic policy constraints may limit consensus and power for implementing these  
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reforms that may, on the contrary, be stimulated by the desire to increase integration 
with trading countries. The significant institutional convergence of this last group of 
countries to the Eurozone levels seems to indicate that regional integration remains a 
powerful force that can enact the institutional change needed to accelerate the process of 
convergence and growth. 
 
Appendix 1:  Composed indicators designed to identify the quality of institutional 
arrangements and policies 
1)  Size of government: expenditures, taxes, and enterprises: 
  a  General government consumption spending as a percentage of total 
consumption; 
  b  Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP; 
  c  Government enterprises and investment as a percentage of GDP; 
  d  Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold to which it applies): (i) top 
marginal tax rate (excluding applicable payroll taxes); (ii) top marginal tax 
rate (including applicable payroll taxes). 
2)  Legal structure and security of property rights:  
  a  Judicial independence—the judiciary is independent and not subject to 
interference by the government or parties in disputes;  
  b  Impartial court. a trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to 
challenge the legality of government actions or regulation;  
  c  Protection of intellectual property;  
  d  Military interference in rule of law and the political process;  
  e  Integrity of the legal system. 
3)  Access to sound money:  
  a  Average annual growth of the money supply in the last five years minus 
average annual growth of real GDP in the last  ten  years; 
 b  Standard  inflation  variability in the last five years; 
  c  Recent inflation rate; 
  d  Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts domestically and abroad.  
4)  Freedom to exchange with foreigners:  
  a  Taxes on international trade: (i) revenue from taxes on international trade as 
a percentage of exports plus imports; (ii) mean tariff rate; (iii) standard 
deviation of tariff rates; 
 b  Regulatory  trade  barriers: (i) hidden import barriers-no barriers other than 
published tariffs and quotas; (ii) costs of importing. the combined effect of  
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import tariffs, licence fees, bank fees, and the time required for 
administrative red-tape raises the costs of importing equipment;  
  c  Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size;  
  d  Difference between official exchange rate and black market rate;  
  e  International capital market controls: (i) access of citizens to foreign capital 
markets and foreign access to domestic capital markets; (ii) restrictions on 
the freedom of citizens to engage in capital market exchange with foreigners 
index of capital controls among 13 IMF categories.  
5) Regulation  of  credit,  labour, and business:  
    a  Credit market regulations: (i) ownership of banks-percentage of deposits 
held in privately owned banks; (ii) competition-domestic banks face 
competition from foreign banks; (iii) extension of credit-percentage of credit 
extended to private sector; (iv) avoidance of interest rate controls and 
regulations that lead to negative real interest rates, and (v)  interest rate 
controls on bank deposits and/or loans are freely determined by the market;  
  b  Labour market regulations: (i) impact of minimum wage-the minimum wage, 
set by law, has little impact on wages because it is too low or not obeyed; 
(ii) hiring and firing practices-hiring and firing practices of companies are 
determined by private contract; (iii) share of labour force whose wages are 
set by centralized collective bargaining; (iv)  unemployment benefits-the 
unemployment benefits system preserves the incentive to work, and (v) use 
of conscripts to obtain military personnel;  
  c  Business regulations: (i) price controls-extent to which businesses are free to 
set their own prices; (ii) administrative conditions and new businesses. 
Administrative procedures are an important obstacle to starting a new 
business; (iii) time with government bureaucracy-senior management spends 
a substantial amount of time dealing with government bureaucracy; 
(iv) starting a new business-starting a new business is generally easy, and 
(v) irregular payments-irregular, additional payments connected with import 
and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, 
police protection, or loan applications are very rare. 
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Appendix 2:  Figures and tables 
Figure 1:  Trade portfolio risk up and downs for MENA, South America and  
HIPC countries 
Figure 2:  Trade shares of MENA and MENA Mediterranean countries 
with the USA and EU 
Figure 3a:  Legal structure and property rights, 
MENA countries compared with representative groups of countries 
Figure 3b:  Quality of institutions and economic policies, 
MENA countries compared with representative groups of countries 
Figure 3c:  Credit labour and business, 
MENA countries compared with representative groups of countries 
 
Table 1:  The relative dynamics of trade portfolio volatility across macroareas 
Table 2:  The impact of trade portfolio volatility in conditional convergence growth 
equations 
Table 3:  Sensitivity analysis on the effects of institutional quality variables in MRW 
estimates with different human and physical capital proxies  
(specifications 4, 5 and 6 of Table 2) 
Table 4:  If institutional coefficients were to be taken seriously .... 
(Additional four year growth of per capita GDP growth of MENA countries 
if institutional indicators were those of OECD non-EU, Eurozone or 
transition candidates)  
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Figure 1  


































Note:  For the definition of trade portfolio risk, see section 4. 
Source:  Authors’ elaboration from Datastream and IMF DOTS database. 
 
Figure 2  
Trade shares of MENA and MENA Mediterranean countries 
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Source:  Authors’ elaboration from Datastream and IMF’s DOTS database. 
 
Figure 3b 
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The relative dynamics of trade portfolio volatility across macroareas 
  Eurozone  OECD non-EU  Transition candidates  Transition non-candidates  MENA  Latin American countries 
1980 0.0001940  0.0005533  0.0025394  0.0001057 0.0021633 0.0005528 
1981 0.0003466  0.0001342  0.0038470  0.0008962 0.0142089 0.0007017 
1982 0.0002000  0.0029110  0.0809345  0.0004692 0.0005651 0.0111006 
1983 0.0001124  0.0016421  0.0002005  0.0001291 0.0003816 0.0631913 
1984 0.0001616  0.0002593  0.0002616  0.0066659 0.0004469 0.0340898 
1985 0.0002898  0.0008257  0.0004359  0.0039779 0.0006245 0.0355935 
1986 0.0000605  0.0003518  0.0005168  0.0002226 0.0029055 0.0031403 
1987 0.0001126  0.0005415  0.0010800  0.0059923 0.0004104 0.0020527 
1988 0.0001461  0.0001425  0.0011811  0.0000959 0.0085016 0.0020502 
1989 0.0001619  0.0001073  0.0327992  0.0002888 0.0018232 0.0171249 
1990 0.0000938  0.0001154  0.0127287  0.0365089 0.0323007 0.0891855 
1991 0.0002720  0.0001120  0.0026689  0.0824572 0.0005244 0.0010962 
1992 0.0003050  0.0001409  0.0006854  0.0203340 0.0003669 0.0008258 
1993 0.0002000  0.0001746  0.0007326  0.0004743 0.0004751 0.0070089 
1994 0.0000563  0.0007834  0.0002169  0.0007963 0.0021457 0.0057376 
1995 0.0001180  0.0005524  0.0042368  0.0002876 0.0009053 0.0009547 
1996 0.0000335  0.0000493  0.0000905  0.0032572 0.0000878 0.0007101 
1997 0.0000489  0.0006753  0.0000663  0.0197763 0.0001135 0.0000907 
1998 0.0000861  0.0003534  0.0003362  0.0045173 0.0002012 0.0002611 
1999 0.0000478  0.0000886  0.0001051  0.0030805 0.0000757 0.0011156 
2000 0.0000362  0.0000832  0.0000648  0.0015527 0.0000576 0.0007141 
Notes:  Eurozone countries: Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland and Greece;  
  OECD high-income countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, Iceland, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, and USA.  
  Transition non-candidates: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russian, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and 
Yugoslavia.  
  Transition candidates (first phase enlargement) Czech R, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak, and Slovenia;  
  MENA countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria Tunisia, and Turkey (data for other MENA countries such as Libya and 
Lebanon not available). 





Table 2  
The impact of trade portfolio volatility in conditional convergence growth equations 
 Fixed  effects   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (4)΄ (5)΄ (6)΄  IV-2SLS (7) 
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 -0.018**   
[-1.94] 
Ln(TPR*smopec)     -0.008   
[-2.56] 







Ln(Indexfree)      0.245   
[7.64] 
   0.260   
[6.18] 
      
Ln(legstrupro)       0.063   
[3.29] 
   0.045   
[1.67] 
    
Ln(credlabus)        0.323** 
[8.30] 
   0.342** 
[7.44] 
  
Dflex              0 . 0 4 5 * *    
[2.45] 
















 0.973**   
[2.47] 
              
F test (overall 
regression significance) 
11.98 12.84   
(0.00) 












  TPR instrumented 
by TWTOTINST & 
TWDIFINT 
R-sq Within  0.1825  0.166  0.1825 0.30  0.23  0.27  0.30 0.20 0.30    0.045 
F test u_i=0 (joint 
significance of fixed 
effects) 
2.24 2.14   
(0.04) 












  1.81 
F test Ho: (1)+(2)=-(3)  0.1131  (0.0826)  0.1131  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.03)     
Observations  434 434 434 570 541 403 570 390 397    320 







Sensitivity analysis on the effects of institutional quality variables in MRW estimates 
with different human and physical capital proxies 
(specifications 4, 5 and 6 of Table 2) 
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Notes:  Estimates are run on eight 5-year spells.  
Variable legend 
 ( Y/L)t0   real per capita GDP of the first year in each 5-year spell;  
 s k :   WB investment to GDP ratio;  
 s h :   net secondary school enrolment ratio;  
  TPR:   trade portfolio volatility (for the definition see section 4).  
  Smopec:    dummy taking unit value for small open economies (which conventionally 
defined as countries with less than 10 million inhabitants and a ratio of import 
plus exports over GDP higher than 50%) and zero otherwise.  
  Dflex:   dummy for de facto flexible exchange rate regimes.  
  Indexfree:  index of economic freedom; 
  Lesgstrupro:   index of legal structure and property rights; 
  credlabus:   index of quality of credit, labour and business regulation (for definitions of the 
institutional indicators see Appendix 1). In column 7 and the TPR variable is 
instrumented by the following two variables:  
   (i)  TWDIFINTij
 =  ( ) ∑ −
j
j Rj Ri x
2
 where Ri is the nominal interest rate of 
country i. (ii) Tvtotinst: indicator of relative institutional strength for country i with 
   TWTOTINSTij
 =  ( ) ∑ −
j
j j INDEXFREED i INDECXREED x
2  
    where indexfreed is defined in Appendix 1 and xj is the share of trade (total 
volume of export plus total volume of import) to the j-th partner out of the i-th 
country total trade (volume of export plus volume of import). 
  T-stats in square brackets.  
  Numbers in parentheses are p-values from the relative F test on the null hypothesis indicated. 
** 95% significance with bootstrap standard errors; * 90% significance with bootstrap standard 
errors. We use the percentile and bias corrected approach with 2000 replications. 
Source:  Authors’ elaboration based on data from Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2000).  
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Table 4 
If institutional coefficients were to be taken seriously .... 
 
(Additional four year growth of per capita GDP growth of MENA countries 
if institutional indicators were those of OECD non-EU, Eurozone or transition candidates) 
  OECD non-EU  Eurozone  Transition candidates 
Indexfree 7.2% 5.4%  1.5% 
Credit, labour and business  13.2%  8.4%  6.2% 
Legal structure and property rights   3.0%  2.7%  0.7% 
Notes:  Simulation realized by taking coefficients magnitude from columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table 2 and by 
replacing institutional values of MENA countries with those of the group of countries indicated in 
each of Table 4 columns.  
 
 
Legend:  Indexfreed: index of the quality of institutions and of economic policies. It is measured as a 
simple average of the following composed indicators: 
   1)  Size of government: expenditures, taxes, and enterprises 
     a  General government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption 
    b  Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP 
     c  Government enterprises and investment as a percentage of GDP  
    d  Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold to which it applies) (i) top marginal tax rate 
(excluding applicable payroll taxes); (ii) top marginal tax rate (including applicable payroll 
taxes) 
   2)  Legstrupropri  
    a  Judicial independence—the judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by 
the government or parties in disputes  
    b  Impartial court—a trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the 
legality of government actions or regulation  
    c  Protection of intellectual property  
    d  Military interference in rule of law and the political process  
    e  Integrity of the legal system 
 3)  Moneyacces 
    a  Average annual growth of the money supply in the last five years minus average annual 
growth of real GDP in the last 10 years 
    b  Standard inflation variability in the last 5 years 
    c  Recent inflation rate 
    d  Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts domestically and abroad  
 4)  Freedomexc   
    a  Taxes on international trade (i) revenue from taxes on international trade as a percentage 
of exports plus imports; (ii) mean tariff rate; (iii) standard deviation of tariff rates 
    b  Regulatory trade barriers (i) hidden import barriers-no barriers other than published tariffs 
and quotas; (ii) costs of importing—the combined effect of import tariffs, licence fees, 
bank fees, and the time required for administrative red-tape raises the costs of importing 
equipment  
    c  Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size  
    d  Difference between official exchange rate and black market rate  
    e  International capital market controls (i) access of citizens to foreign capital markets and 
foreign access to domestic capital markets; (ii) restrictions on the freedom of citizens to 
engage in capital market exchange with foreigners index of capital controls among 13 
IMF categories  
 …/.  
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 5)  Credlabbus 
     a  Credit market regulations (i) ownership of banks-percentage of deposits held in privately 
owned banks; (ii) competition-domestic banks face competition from foreign banks; 
(iii) extension of credit-percentage of credit extended to private sector; (iv) avoidance of 
interest rate controls and regulations that lead to negative real interest rates, and 
(v)  interest rate controls on bank deposits and/or loans are freely determined by the 
market  
    b  Labour market regulations (i) impact of minimum wage-the minimum wage, set by law, 
has little impact on wages because it is too low or not obeyed; (ii) hiring and firing 
practices-hiring and firing practices of companies are determined by private contract; 
(iii)  share of labour force whose wages are set by centralized collective bargaining; 
(iv) unemployment benefits-the unemployment benefits system preserves the incentive to 
work, and (v) use of conscripts to obtain military personnel  
    c  Business regulations (i) price controls-extent to which businesses are free to set their 
own prices; (ii) administrative conditions and new businesses. Administrative procedures 
are an important obstacle to starting a new business; (iii) time with government 
bureaucracy-senior management spends a substantial amount of time dealing with 
government bureaucracy; (iv) starting a new business-starting a new business is 
generally easy, and (v) irregular payments-irregular, additional payments connected with 
import and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police 
protection, or loan applications are very rare. 
Source:  Authors’ elaboration based on data from Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2000).  
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